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Abstract—We investigate the physical-layer security of in-
door hybrid parallel power-line/wireless orthogonal-frequency
division-multiplexing (OFDM) communication systems. We pro-
pose an artificial-noise (AN) aided scheme to enhance the system’s
security in the presence of an eavesdropper by exploiting the
decoupled nature of the power-line and wireless communication
media. The proposed scheme does not require the instantaneous
channel state information of the eavesdropper’s links to be known
at the legitimate nodes. In our proposed scheme, the legitimate
transmitter (Alice) and the legitimate receiver (Bob) cooperate to
secure the hybrid system where an AN signal is shared from Bob
to Alice on the link with the lower channel-to-noise ratio (CNR)
while the information stream in addition to a noisy-amplified
version of the received AN signal is transmitted from Alice to
Bob on the link with higher CNR at each OFDM sub-channel.
In addition, we investigate the effect of the transmit power levels
at both Alice and Bob and the power allocation ratio between
the data and AN signals at Alice on the secure throughput.
We investigate both single-link eavesdropping attacks, where
only one link is exposed to eavesdropping attacks, and two-
link eavesdropping attacks, where the two links are exposed to
eavesdropping attacks.
Index Terms—Wiretap channel, hybrid systems, artificial noise
I. INTRODUCTION
Hybrid parallel information transmission over two different
media has received increased attention recently. For example,
the availability of both power-line and wireless links in Smart
Grid (SG) networks can be exploited to enhance the data rate
and/or reliability of two-way communications [1]–[3].
One of the most critical vulnerabilities in SGs is the
confidentiality of the measurement and management informa-
tion messages [4]. The privacy of the consumers’ electricity
consumption information can be compromised by intercept-
ing the signal exchanges between consumers and the utility.
One application that motivated this work is securing two-
way vehicle-to-grid (V2G) communications between electric
vehicle charging stations and data aggregators over power-line
and unlicensed wireless links [5].
In the seminal work of Wyner [6], a system’s physical
layer (PHY) security was characterized in terms of the secrecy
capacity which was defined as the maximum transmission
rate of the legitimate link without information leakage to an
eavesdropper. Recently, the authors of [7] showed that the
secrecy capacity in power-line communications (PLC) is fairly
low compared to wireless communications, especially in the
high signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) regime. Motivated by the data
rate gains of multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) in PLC,
the authors of [8] showed that MIMO techniques enhance the
PHY security of PLC. In [9], the authors investigated the PHY
security in multi-carrier and multi-user broadcast systems. The
This work is supported by Hyundai Inc.
effect of the channel statistics on the achievable secrecy rate
was analyzed.
Unlike the above-mentioned work, we do not assume that
the eavesdropper’s channel state information (CSI) is known
at the legitimate nodes. Instead, we design an artificial-
noise (AN) scheme to enhance the hybrid system’s security.
Although several recent papers [2], [3] investigated hybrid
parallel PLC/wireless systems to enhance reliability and data
rates, their PHY security has not been investigated.
The singular-value decomposition (SVD)-based AN-aided
scheme was proposed in the wireless PHY-security literature,
see [10] and references therein, where AN vectors are transmit-
ted in a direction orthogonal to the data vectors. Since the PLC
and wireless media are decoupled, the SVD-based scheme fails
to enhance the security because the eavesdropper can always
intercept the transmitted data over each sub-channel. This
motivates us to propose a new AN-aided scheme that exploits
the decoupled nature of hybrid parallel systems. Although we
consider a hybrid parallel PLC/wireless system as a case study,
our proposed scheme is applicable to other media diversity
transmissions with two decoupled communications media.
The contributions of this paper are summarized as follows
• We propose a new AN-aided scheme to improve the PHY
security of hybrid parallel PLC/wireless transmissions
which is based on the cooperation between the legiti-
mate transmitter (Alice) and legitimate receiver (Bob).
We investigate single-link eavesdropping attacks, where
only one link is exposed to eavesdropping attacks, and
two-link eavesdropping attacks, where the two links are
exposed to eavesdropping attacks. We compute the in-
stantaneous secrecy rate (ISR) of the proposed scheme
which is then used to evaluate the secure throughput of
the hybrid PLC/wireless communication system.
• For the case of two-link eavesdropping, unlike the no-
AN scenario, where we show that the ISR depends on
the links’ CSI and saturates at high Alice’s input SNR
levels, the ISR of our proposed scheme, at infinite Alice’s
transmit power, is independent of the eavesdropper’s
CSI. Hence, the ISR is known at Alice in each channel
realization and Alice can adjust the secrecy transmission
rate to be equal to the ISR. Moreover, our proposed
scheme can achieve any target secrecy rate based on the
proper selection of the transmit powers at both Alice and
Bob and the power allocation ratio between the data and
AN signals at Alice.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider an indoor hybrid parallel PLC/wireless system
as in, e.g., [2], [3], and shown in Fig. 1. A legitimate source
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Fig. 1: Hybrid parallel wireless/PLC system.
node (Alice) communicates with her legitimate destination
node (Bob) in the presence of a passive eavesdropping node
(Eve). For notational convenience, we will use the subscripts
A, B, and E to denote Alice, Bob, and Eve, respectively. For
Eve, we assume single-link eavesdropping, where one Eve is
located at one medium only (either PLC or wireless), and the
two-link eavesdropping, where one eavesdropper is located at
each medium. Each node has one wireless transceiver and one
PLC transceiver. Alice transmits her data using orthogonal
frequency-division multiplexing (OFDM) as will be explained
in details in the next section.
Alice and Bob perform the channel estimation by sharing
a known sequence of pilots at the beginning of each channel
coherence interval. Subsequently, Alice and Bob can estimate
their channel coefficients while their channel remains unknown
at Eve. In addition, we assume that the channel coefficients
between Alice and Eve are only known to Eve. Hence, we do
not assume the availability of Eve’s instantaneous CSI at the
legitimate nodes.
In PLC, the links between Alice, Bob and Eve are interde-
pendent. To capture these dependencies, we apply the bottom-
up approach as in [8] to compute the channel frequency
responses of the PLC links. Although the PLC link is often
affected by non-Gaussian additive noise in the time domain,
the colored-Gaussian additive noise model is a good model in
the frequency domain due to the fast Fourier transform (FFT)
processing of the received samples. For the wireless channel,
each coefficient of the channel impulse response (CIR) is
modeled as a zero-mean circularly-symmetric Gaussian ran-
dom variable. The channel impulse response (CIR) coeffi-
cients of a wireless link are assumed to be independent and
identically distributed (i.i.d.) zero-mean circularly-symmetric
Gaussian random variables with variance σ2i,m1−m2 for the ith
coefficient of the m1 −m2 link, where m1,m2 ∈ {A,B,E}
and i = {0, 1, 2, . . . , νWm1−m2} with νWm1−m2 denoting the
delay spread of the wireless link m1−m2. The additive noise
in the wireless medium is modeled as an additive Gaussian
noise (AGN) random process.
III. PHY SECURITY OF THE HYBRID PARALLEL
PLC/WIRELESS SYSTEMS WITHOUT AN INJECTION
Let ℓ ∈ {P,W} denote the PLC and wireless media,
respectively. Denote the channel coefficient at sub-channel k
of the m1−m2 link over medium ℓ ∈ {P,W} by Hℓm1−m2,k,
where m1,m2 ∈ {A,B,E}. Alice transmits her data over N
orthogonal sub-channels using OFDM. We assume a single
data stream transmission over each sub-channel. Since the
PLC and wireless media are decoupled, the rate of each sub-
channel of the Alice-Bob link is maximized when the Alice-
Bob link with the higher channel-to-noise ratio (CNR) over
the two media is selected. Hence, the data stream at each sub-
channel is transmitted over the link with the higher CNR. We
call this scheme ‘transmit-selection combining (TSC)’. Since
Alice does not have any knowledge about Eve’s instantaneous
CSI, she can only optimize her transmit power levels across
the OFDM sub-channels to maximize the rate of her own
link (i.e. Alice-Bob link). Hence, Alice first computes, at
each sub-channel, the maximum of the Alice-Bob link channel
gains over the two media. Then, she performs the water-filling
algorithm to maximize her transmission rate. For simplicity,
we assume equal power allocation over the active sub-channels
whose indices are determined from the water-filling algorithm
[11]. Assuming that Alice’s total transmit power is constrained
by PA Watts, then the power allocated to the kth OFDM sub-
channel, denoted by pA,k, is
pA,k =
{
PA/|A|, if the kth OFDM sub-channel is active
0, otherwise (1)
where A is the set of active sub-channels, | · | denotes either
absolute value or set cardinality depending on the context in
which it is used, and |A| is the number of active sub-channels
(|A| ≤ N ). We emphasize that optimizing the power levels
over the active OFDM sub-channels to maximize the rate
of the Alice-Bob link will add computational complexity to
the problem due to the iterative solution without a significant
rate gain over our assumed equal-power allocation over the
active sub-channels, as was shown in [11]. For single-link
eavesdropping, the achievable rates at both Bob and Eve over
sub-channel k are thus given by
RA−B,k=log2
(
1 + |HikHA−B,k|2Γ
ikH
A−B,k
)
, k ∈ A
RA−E,k= Iik
H
log2
(
1 + |HikHA−E,k|2Γi
k
H
A−E,k
)
, k ∈ A
(2)
where ikH ∈{P,W} (ikL∈{P,W}) denotes the medium where
the Alice-Bob link has the higher (lower) CNR over sub-
channel k, Γℓm1−m2,k is the input SNR at OFDM sub-channel
k over medium ℓ∈{P,W} of the m1 −m2 link while IikH is
given by
Iik
H
=
{
1, if Eve eavesdrops on link ikH (i.e. iE = ikH )
0, otherwise (3)
where iE ∈ {P,W} is the link over which Eve is eavesdrop-
ping. For the quasi-static channel model assumed in this paper,
and since Eve’s CSI is not known at Alice, Alice transmits her
data with a target/fixed secrecy rate R bits per OFDM block. If
R is less than or equal to the rate of the Alice-Bob link, Alice
transmits her data to Bob. Otherwise, she remains silent during
the current transmission block to avoid transmission outage.
If R is higher than the ISR, then there is secrecy outage and
the secrecy is compromised. If R is less than or equal to the
ISR, then there is no secrecy outage and the data is decoded at
Bob and secured from Eve. The system’s security performance
is measured by the secure throughput, which is defined to be
the number of securely decoded bits at Bob per second per
Hertz. First, we compute the ISR, then we use it to calculate
the secure throughput.
For an OFDM-based system, the ISR is given by
RsecA−B =
[∑
k∈A
RA−B,k −
∑
k∈A
RA−E,k
]+
(4)
where [·]+ = max{·, 0}. The ISR of the hybrid parallel
PLC/wireless system under single-link eavesdropping is thus
given by
RsecA−B =
∑
k∈A
log2
 1 + |HikHA−B,k|2ΓikHA−B,k
1 + Iik
H
|HikHA−E,k|2Γ
ikH
A−E,k
+ (5)
while under two-link eavesdropping is given by
RsecA−B =
∑
k∈A
log2
1 + |HikHA−B,k|2ΓikHA−B,k
1 + |HikHA−E,k|2Γ
ik
H
A−E,k
+ (6)
which is finite at infinite input SNR and depends on the
instantaneous CSI of the links. At infinite input SNR levels,
the secrecy rate of the hybrid parallel PLC/wireless system in
(6) is given by
RsecA−B =
∑
k∈A
log2
 |HikHA−B,k|2κikHE,k
|HikHA−E,k|2κ
ik
H
B,k
+ (7)
The secure throughput is defined as follows
µ = RPr{RsecA−B ≥ R} (8)
where Pr{RsecA−B < R} denotes the secrecy rate outage
probability.
We consider three scenarios for eavesdropping attacks: i)
single-link eavesdropping attacks which includes two cases:
1) Eve is eavesdropping on the PLC link only; or 2) Eve
is eavesdropping on the wireless link only; and ii) two-link
non-colluding eavesdropping attacks where one Eve is eaves-
dropping on the PLC link and the other Eve is eavesdropping
on the wireless link. Due to space limitations, the case of
colluding eavesdropping where the eavesdroppers share the
received signals is left for future work since its analysis is
lengthy.
IV. PROPOSED AN-AIDED TRANSMISSION SCHEME
In this section, we propose an AN-aided scheme which
increases the secure throughput by exploiting the decoupled
nature of the hybrid media. In our proposed scheme, which
we refer to as the ‘AN-sharing scheme’, we assume that Bob
transmits AN symbols to Alice over each active OFDM sub-
channel. At the same time, based on the location of Eve,
we have two scenarios. If Eve is located at the medium
which has the higher CNR, Bob transmits the AN symbol
over the link with the lower CNR, which was not utilized
in the no-AN scenario. Otherwise, Bob remains silent since
the data is not exposed to eavesdropping and there is no AN
injection. Nevertheless, in case of two-link eavesdropping as
will be discussed shortly, Bob will always share AN over
the lower CNR link to confuse both eavesdroppers. To allow
simultaneous reception and transmission over different media
(i.e. PLC and wireless) per a sub-channel, and since Alice
needs to forward Bob’s AN signals, at the beginning of each
coherence time, Bob transmits one OFDM block and Alice
remains silent. In the following transmission times, Bob sends
new AN signals and Alice forwards the previously-received
AN symbols and transmits her data. The AN symbols are
generated from a random codebook which is only known
at Bob. To maximize the rate of the Alice-Bob link, Alice
transmits the data symbols over the Alice-Bob link with
the higher CNR at each OFDM sub-channel along with an
amplified noisy version of the AN symbol received from Bob.
Since Bob is the only node who knows the AN codebook and
symbols, he can remove the interference caused by the AN
symbols prior to information decoding while Eve does not
know the used AN codebook and, hence, cannot remove them.
The received signal at Alice over sub-channel k is given by
Ak = Hi
k
L
A−B,kZB,k +N
ikL
A,k
(9)
where Hi
k
L
A−B,k is the channel coefficient at sub-channel k
of the Alice-Bob link where the (PLC or wireless) medium
with the lower CNR is selected. In addition, ZB,k with power
E {ZB,kZB,k∗} = pBA,k = PB|A| is the zero-mean AN symbol
transmitted from Bob to Alice over sub-channel k with PB
denoting the total power budget at Bob in Watts, and N i
k
H
A,k is
the AGN signal at Alice over sub-channel k of medium ikH .
Alice transmits the following signal over sub-channel k
Tk=Xk+ωkAk=Xk+ωk
(
H
ikL
A−B,kZB,k +N
ikL
A,k
)
(10)
where Xk is the data symbol transmitted over sub-channel
k with power E {XkX∗k} = θPA/|A| where 0 ≤ θPA ≤
PA is the portion of the total power budget PA assigned to
data transmissions, and ωk is the weight coefficient used at
sub-channel k for AN transmission. As in the amplify-and-
forward relaying scheme, Alice first normalizes the power of
the received signal from Bob at sub-channel k using a weight
of 1/
√
|HikLA−B,k|2 PB|A|+κ
ikL
B,k with κℓm2,k denoting the additive
noise power at OFDM sub-channel k over medium ℓ of node
m2 ∈ {A,B,E}. Then, she multiplies this signal by the AN
allocated power coefficient given by
√
(1− θ) PA|A| . Thus, ωk =√
pA,k/κ
ikH
A ×
√
(1− θ)/
√
|HikLA−B,k|2Γ
ikL
B−A,k + 1.
The received signal at Bob over OFDM sub-channel k of
medium ikH is given by
Y
ikH
B,k = H
ikH
A−B,k
(
Xk+ωk
(
H
ikL
A−B,kZB,k+N
ikL
A,k
))
+N
ikH
B,k
(11)
where N i
k
H
B,k is the corresponding AGN sample at Bob. Since
Bob knows the used AN symbols, he cancels them out prior
to data decoding to get the signal
Y
ikH
B,k−ωkHi
k
L
A−B,kZB,k=H
ikH
A−B,k
(
Xk+ωkN
ikL
A,k
)
+N
ikH
B,k
(12)
The received signal at Bob in (12) is affected by the AGN
of Alice forwarded with Bob’s AN signal, i.e., the term
H
ikH
A−B,kωkN
ikL
A,k.
A. single-link Eavesdropping
When Eve is only eavesdropping on one medium, say
medium iE = ikH (iE ∈ {P,W}), her received signal is
Y
ikH
E,k=H
ikH
A−E,k
(
Xk+ωk
(
H
ikL
A−B,kZB,k+N
ikL
A,k
))
+N
ikH
E,k
(13)
If Eve is eavesdropping on medium iE = ikL, the eavesdropper
receives AGN only since this medium is unused over the k-th
sub-channel. The rates of the Alice-Bob and Alice-Eve links
at sub-channel k are thus given, respectively, by
RA−B,k= Iik
H
log2
1+ |H
ikH
A−B,k|2θΓ
ikH
A−B,k
|HikHA−B,k|2
(1−θ)Γi
k
H
A−B,k
|Hi
k
L
A−B,k|2Γ
ik
L
B−A,k+1
+ 1

+ (1− Iik
H
) log2
(
1+|HikHA−B,k|2Γ
ikH
A−B,k
)
(14)
and
RA−E,k = Iik
H
log2
1 + |HikHA−E,k|2θΓikHA−B,k
|HikHA−E,k|2(1− θ)Γ
ik
H
A−B,k + 1
 (15)
where k ∈ A. The ISR of the AN-sharing scheme under
single-link eavesdropping is given by
RsecA−B =

∑
k∈A
Iik
H
log2
1+ |H
ikH
A−B,k|2θΓi
k
H
A−B,k
|HikHA−B,k|2
(1−θ)Γi
k
H
A−B,k
|Hi
k
L
A−B,k|2Γ
ik
L
B−A,k+1
+ 1

+(1− Iik
H
) log2
(
1+|HikHA−B,k|2Γi
k
H
A−B,k
)
−
∑
k∈A
Iik
H
log2
1 + |HikHA−E,k|2θΓikHA−B,k
|HikHA−E,k|2(1− θ)Γ
ik
H
A−B,k + 1
+
(16)
B. Two-Link Eavesdropping
With two eavesdroppers (i.e., two-link eavesdropping), the
rates of the Alice-Bob and Alice-Eve links at sub-channel k
are thus given, respectively, by
RA−B,k=log2
1+ |H
ikH
A−B,k|2θΓi
k
H
A−B,k
|HikHA−B,k|2
(1−θ)Γi
k
H
A−B,k
|Hi
k
L
A−B,k|2Γ
ik
L
B−A,k+1
+ 1
 (17)
and
RA−E,k = log2
1 + |HikHA−E,k|2θΓikHA−B,k
|HikHA−E,k|2(1− θ)Γ
ik
H
A−B,k + 1
 (18)
where k ∈ A.
Since each Eve is eavesdropping on a medium, the received
signal at Eve over medium ikL and ikH , respectively, are given
by
Y
ikL
E,k = H
ikL
B−E,kZB,k +N
ikL
E,k
Y
ikH
E,k=H
ikH
A−E,k
(
Xk+ωk
(
H
ikL
A−B,kZB,k+N
ikL
A,k
))
+N
ikH
E,k
(19)
Hence, the rate of the Alice-Eve link at sub-channel k is
RA−E,k = log2
1 + |HikHA−E,k|2θΓikHA−B,k
|HikHA−E,k|2(1− θ)Γ
ik
H
A−B,k + 1
 (20)
where k ∈ A. The ISR of the AN-sharing scheme under the
two-link eavesdropping is given by
RsecA−B =

∑
k∈A
log2
1 + |H
ikH
A−B,k|2θΓ
ikH
A−B,k
|HikHA−B,k|2
(1−θ)Γi
k
H
A−B,k
|Hi
k
L
A−B,k|2Γ
ik
L
B−A,k+1
+ 1

−
∑
k∈A
log2
1 + |HikHA−E,k|2θΓikHA−E,k
|HikHA−E,k|2(1− θ)Γ
ikH
A−E,k + 1
+
(21)
Remark 1: Over each OFDM sub-channel, the AN-sharing
scheme benefits from media diversity by selecting the better
link to transmit data. Moreover, there is no rate loss due to
transmitting the AN over the other link which was not used
in the hybrid parallel PLC/wireless systems with no AN.
From (21), the transmit power level at Bob, included in the
SNR level Γi
k
L
B−A,k, only affects the rate of the Alice-Bob link.
Moreover, the ISR in (21) is monotonically increasing with
Γ
ikL
B−A,k. The intuitive explanation of this fact is as follows.
Since Bob sends AN signal to Alice and Alice amplifies-
and-forwards her received signal, the quality of the forwarded
AN signal depends on PB or, more specifically, on the ratio
between the AN power used at Bob and the AGN power at
Alice, which is given by Γi
k
L
B−A,k. If Γ
ikL
B−A,k is high, the signal
forwarded by Alice is dominated by the AN signal, which is
only known at Bob and can be completely canceled prior to
information decoding. However, if Γi
k
L
B−A,k is low, the signal
forwarded by Alice will be dominated by AGN, which is a
random signal and unknown to both Bob and Eve. Hence, the
noise signal forwarded by Alice will hurt both Bob and Eve
and the ISR will decrease accordingly. In addition, the impact
of Alice’s power level PA on the ISR in (21) is dependent
on Bob’s power level PB. If PB is high, increasing PA will
definitely increase the ISR since the forwarded signal by Alice
will be dominated by the AN signal which is known to Bob.
Hence, increasing PA will only hurt Eve. On the other hand, if
PB is low, increasing PA hurts both Bob and Eve, and it might
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Fig. 2: Secure throughput versus Alice input SNR).
be the case that increasing PA hurts Bob more than Eve if the
Alice-Bob channel gain is higher than the Alice-Eve channel
gain over the lower-CNR medium.
At infinite PA, (21) reduces to
RsecA−B=
[∑
k∈A
log2
(
1 +
αk
PB
|A|+1
θ˜
)
−|A| log2
(
1
1−θ
)]+
(22)
where αk =
|Hi
k
L
A−B,k|2
κ
ik
L
B,k
and θ˜ = (1−θ)θ . It is noteworthy that the
ISR at infinite PA is independent of Eve’s CSI (i.e. the rate of
the Alice-Eve link will be |A| log2 11−θ which is completely
determined by the choice of θ at Alice). This is an interesting
result since Alice can adjust her secrecy rate in each coherence
interval to secure her transmissions. That is, in each coherence
interval, Alice sets R to RsecA−B.
For fixed-data rate applications where Alice transmits with
a target secrecy rate R or when Alice wishes to send her data
with a positive secrecy rate R by setting RsecA−B ≥ R, we
will derive a sufficient condition on Bob’s transmit power to
mitigate the secrecy rate outage events, i.e., the cases RsecA−B <
R. The only term that depends on the sub-channel index k in
(22) is αk. Since the logarithmic function is monotonically
decreasing with its argument, to obtain a lower-bound on the
ISR, we can replace all αk in (22) with the minimum among
all {αk}|A|k=1 over all active sub-channels. That is, we set αk =
α = minℓ∈A αℓ. Hence, a lower-bound is given by
RsecA−B ≥ |A|
(
log2
(
1 +
α PB|A|+1
θ˜
)
− log2
(
1
1− θ
))
(23)
To mitigate the secrecy outage events in a given coherence
interval or to achieve a positive secrecy rate of R bits per
OFDM block, a sufficient condition is to make the lower-
bound on the secrecy rate higher than the target secrecy rate
R. Hence, after some manipulations, the condition on Bob’s
transmit power to mitigate the secrecy outage events is
PB ≥ |A|
θ˜
(
2
R
|A|
(
1
1−θ
)
− 1
)
− 1
α
(24)
By setting R = 0 in (24), we find that PB > 0 is a sufficient
condition to achieve a non-zero ISR. This further demonstrates
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Fig. 3: Secure throughput versus Bob’s AN-sharing input SNR.
the gain of our proposed AN-sharing scheme over the no-
AN scenario which may achieve a zero ISR for some channel
realizations as argued below (6).
Remark 2: Our proposed AN-sharing scheme cannot be less
secure than the no-AN sharing scheme since the latter is a
special case of the former by setting θ to 1. More specifically,
substituting with θ = 1 in (21), we obtain the ISR of the
no-AN system in (6).
V. SIMULATION RESULTS
In this section, we investigate the performance of the
proposed AN-sharing scheme and compare it with the TSC
and single-link schemes. The PLC channel frequency response
follows a deterministic channel model obtained from [12]
while the wireless channel amplitude gain follows a Rayleigh
distribution. Denote the delay spread of the m1 − m2 link
of the PLC medium by νPm1−m2 . We assume that the cyclic
prefix (CP) length is Ncp = νPm1−m2 = νWm1−m2 = 16.
Unless otherwise stated, we use the system parameters in [8],
κℓm,k = κ, σ
2
i,m1−m2 = 1/(Ncp + 1), R = 1 bits/sec/Hz,
N = 64, θ = 1/2, ΓA =
PA
NκN = 20 dB, ΓB =
PB
NκN = 20 dB.
The simulations are performed under the worst-case scenario
assumption of two-link eavesdropping. The secure throughput
is measured in bits/sec/Hz which is obtained by dividing the
expression in (8) by (N + Ncp). We quantify the following
four important system performance aspects: 1) the secure
throughput gain when using a wireless medium in addition
to the PLC medium; 2) the secure throughput gain due to
data/AN power allocation optimization at Alice; 3) the impact
of input SNR at both Alice and Bob on the secure throughput;
and 4) the secure throughput gain of our proposed AN-sharing
scheme relative to the no-AN scenario.
In Fig. 2, we compare the secure throughput of the hybrid
parallel system, both with and without AN, with the PLC-
only and wireless-only systems. As Alice’s transmit power
level increases (i.e., as ΓA increases), the secure through-
put is non-decreasing for all systems. Our proposed scheme
achieves the upper bound performance where the achievable
secure throughput is equal to the target secrecy rate R = 1
bits/sec/Hz. The wireless-only system outperforms the PLC-
only system since the wireless link follows a statistical dis-
tribution and therefore it has higher diversity than the PLC
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Fig. 4: Secure throughput with respect to the target (required)
secrecy rate R.
channel which is assumed to have a deterministic nature. TSC
outperforms the PLC-only and wireless-only systems due to
the diversity introduced by combining the two media. The
proposed AN-sharing scheme significantly outperforms the
TSC scheme since in the AN-sharing case the eavesdropper
suffers heavily from the injected AN. In the TSC scheme, Bob
and Eve sub-channels have similar average power gains and
Alice selects the sub-channels to Bob that have higher CNRs.
In contrast, the AN-sharing scheme degrades Eve’s SNR and
offers SNR gains for Bob over Eve. The only price paid in
our proposed scheme is that Bob will use its power to share
the AN with Alice.
Fig. 3 shows that the secure throughput for the AN-sharing
scheme increases with ΓB, which corroborates our discussions
in Section IV. At low ΓB levels, Alice’s AGN, which is
forwarded by Alice with the AN signal, becomes comparable
to the AN power and degrades Bob’s ability to cancel the AN.
That is, the forwarded AN signal by Alice is dominated by the
AGN which is random at both Bob and Eve and degrades the
received signals at both of them. In contrast, as ΓB increases,
Alice’s AGN transmitted with the AN becomes negligible.
Hence, Bob cancels the AN effectively.
Fig. 4 depicts the secure throughput versus the target secrecy
rate R. As expected, for all scenarios, the secure throughput
increases linearly with R until the optimal R is reached, then
it starts decreasing. The optimal value for R of our proposed
AN-aided scheme is around 2.5 bits/sec/Hz. This shows a
significant secure throughput gain compared to TSC which has
a maximum secure throughput around R = 0.5 bits/sec/Hz.
Fig. 5 shows the secure throughput as a function of
0 ≤ θ ≤ 1. The figure demonstrates that our AN-aided
scheme will achieve the required secure throughput as long
as the transmission power is balanced between data and AN
transmissions. The case of θ = 1 corresponds to allocating
all transmit power to data and zero power to AN which is
the TSC case. This further shows the throughput gain of our
scheme relative to TSC.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
To enhance the security of OFDM-based hybrid parallel
PLC/wireless systems, we proposed an AN-aided scheme
which exploits the decoupled nature of the PLC and wireless
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Fig. 5: Secure throughput with respect to Bob’s AN sharing
input SNR.
media. We showed that the ISR of our proposed scheme, at
infinite Alice transmit power level, is independent of the eaves-
dropper’s CSI. Moreover, our proposed scheme can achieve
any target secrecy rate by adjusting the transmit power levels
at both Alice and Bob. Our numerical results quantified the
appreciable secure throughput gains of our proposed AN-
sharing scheme compared to the no-AN scenario for different
operating conditions.
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